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Surrogate Parenting: 
Social, Legal and Ethical Implications 
Robert Barnet 
The author, a Reno, Nel'ada physician, II'rote the/aI/aIring article/or a 
class in Theological Ethics at the Unil'ersity a/' Notre Dame where he has 
heen studring/or a master's degree. 
New rep rod uctive techndlogies. including artificial donor insemination. 
in vitro fertilization. embryo transfer. the use of frozen embryos and 
"surrogate motherhood" have raised numerous ethica l and legal 
questions. The "Baby M" melodrama in New Jersey thrust the surrogate 
issue into the daily newspaper and evening TV broadcasts. The New Jersey 
case centered primarily around the issue of fit parenthood and contract 
law and became a custody battle rather than a forum for the discussion of 
substantive ethica l issues.! A myriad of legal and eth ical issues has come to 
the forefront. Surrogate arrangements alter the traditional personalized 
reproductive relationship and create a separation or redefinition of 
gestational. genetic and social parenthood. The motives of the biological 
mother. as well as those of the biological father and. potentially. both 
spouses, as well as the effects on other family members are now being 
considered, dissected and questioned. The impact on the child itself is just 
beginning to be examined . , 
Reproduction in humans at this point in time still remains collaborative. 
Traditionally, human reproduction has involved collaboration between a 
male who provides the sperm and a woman who produces the ovum . 
Artificial insemination, embryo transfer and surrogate parenthood have 
expanded the number of individ uals involved in this collaborative activity 
and have added new psychological , legal. social, ethical and practical 
dimensions. Attorneys, physicians, judges and even guardians are now 
participants. The traditional understanding of parenthood has been 
blurred and new terms have been introduced so that we now speak of 
social, gestational, biological and genetic parenthood; some authors have 
even described the biological mother as "the uterine mother." 2 The use of 
this latter term not only ignores the biological unity of pregnancy for the 
mother, but also the psychological bonding which takes place. The 
utilization of such terms reinforces the concern of those who fear the 
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commercialization of reproduction. and both the potential and real 
exploitation of the biological mothers. 
Terminology 
"Surrogate", as commonly used today, is not a precise term. The origin 
of the word is based on its usage in English law, in which a "surrogate" is 
appointed as a substitute or stand-in for another. The woman. however, 
who bears the child in surrogate parenting is the source of the egg, carries 
the child and gives birth J She is in no sense a "substitute" mother and is 
typically both the biological and genetic mother. Under these 
circumstances then, she is clearly not a substitute. The mother who is the 
gestational mother is best identified not as a "surrogate mother" but as a 
" biological mother". In order to clarify terms further, we will describe the 
man who provides the sperm as the "biological" or "genetic" father. 
Since there are multiple possible arrangements, all of which involve 
some sort of substitution, it is also appropriate to use the term "surrogate 
parenting" to describe the entire topic. Although it might be argued that 
the biological mother is really a "substitute spouse" , since there is no 
marriage between the two parties, that is an inappropriate designation for 
either. There are obviously numerous possible variations on surrogate 
parenting, some of which do not involve a spouse either of the biological 
mother or the biological father, as we shall see shortly. In an attempt to 
keep clear the identifications of the various individuals involved, we will 
use the term "adoptive mother" to identify the spouse of a biological father 
when those two individuals plan to take over the primary parenting 
("raising") of the child .4 
Let us next review several other possible arrangements. The most typical 
situation is the one in which there is a married couple who wish to have a 
child with a genetic link to the father. The man supplies the sperm to be 
utilized in the fertilization of a woman who supplies the ovum and will bear 
the child. That woman is commonly married (although nb t always) and 
has a husband who has a peripheral, but not disinterested, relationship 
with the biological mother. In this first and most typical example, the 
biological mother is also the genetic mother. 
The second common arrangement is one in which there is a married man 
who supplies the sperm, and a genetic and biological mother is unmarried. 
Both of these arrangements may also involve siblings on either side of the 
biological tree. The complexity of the family structures will, of course, also 
vary, depending upon what the prior marriage and reproductive history is 
of all the members involved. What is clear is that a vast number of 
individuals may be both involved and affected by surrogate arrangements. 
Although we will deal primarily with these first two most common 
categories, other possibilities include two adopting parents and a genetic 
and biological mother using a donor sperm. In such a case there is no direct 
genetic tie of the child with either the adopting father or adopting mother. 
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A fourth possibility is that there is a single adopting parent (either male or 
female) and the genetic and biological mother provides the child which is 
the result of her ovum and a "donor" sperm. There is always the possibility, 
however, that the fertilizing sperm is that of either a consort or spouse. 
That fact may remain unknown to some or all of the collaborating parties. 5 
A fifth category is when there is a biological adopting father who is a 
"single parent", in which case the child is a result of an ovum from the 
biological (and therefore genetic) mother and his sperm. A sixth category 
in which in vitro fertilization is possible is that in which the biological 
mother has no genetic link and some variation of the genetic father, genetic 
mother, nongenetic father, nongenetic mother is present. This latter 
category is less freq uent , involves embryo transfer or donated egg and will 
not be a major consideration in this discussion. 
Legal Consideration 
With proper safeguards, there appears to be no uniform legal 
prohibition at the present time against surrogate parenting in principle . 
The procedure, when commercial. has been made illegal in Great Britain . 
I n the United States , there is no firm consensus on its legal status. There 
are currently some moves directed at placing legal constraints on the 
practice, primarily for the protection of the child. The Victoria , Australia 
Infertility Act of 1984 (Act No. 10163) prohibits anyone from publishing 
an advertisement seeking or offering a woman's services as surrogate 
mother, as well as giving or receiving payment for surrogate arrangements. 
This legislation also involves the possibility of two years imprisonment 
and declares void any "contract under which a woman agrees to act as a 
surrogate." The Kentucky Supreme Court in 1986 declared that surrogate 
parenting did not violate statutes (which exist in all states) against "buying 
and selling of children ." Dissenting opinions were expressed at the time, 
but the procedure is not outlawed . In Michigan, the State Court of 
Appeals (1981) ruled that surrogacy arrangements which involved a 
"payment of money" were not allowed. A subsequen t decision in the 
Michigan Supreme Court (1985) appeared to give legal standing to 
surrogate children, as the biological father was allowed to have his 
paternity entered into the child's birth certificate. The Warnock Report of 
Great Britain (1984) made strong comments on surrogacy, recommending 
that the matter be considered criminal, and further, that "actions of 
professionals engaged in surrogate arrangements" should be criminally 
liable. b Potential legal considerations include questions of the consent of 
the husband of the biological mother, the nature of the contract, the 
consent of the wife of the sperm donor and provisions for unexpected 
contingencies, some of which have already arisen and resulted in 
controversy. Some of these might have an impact on the contractual 
relationship , but also may involve significant unanticipated and 
problematic future responsibilities. Among these are the birth of a 
deformed child , illness of the biological mother during pregnancy, or 
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death of the biological father before the birth. (Surrogate contracts 
typically give the biological father the right to demand abortion if a 
defective child is detected during the pregnancy. In the "Baby M" case, the 
judge ruled this portion of the contract invalid). 
Other legal considerations involve the possibility of divorce and 
subsequent custody arrangements. Does the biological mother have 
greater rights in custody matters than the biological father or the adoptive 
mother? If the biological father dies during (or following) the pregnancy, 
what is the fate ofthe child? Add to the question of custody matters of both 
property rights and support responsibilities, and it is obvious that the legal 
implications are endless. None of these matters are really new issues in 
themselves, of course, but with surrogacy the complexity expands 
enormously, and with it, the probability of more adverse social and 
psychological harm to the child. 
An additional legal concern is that the la wyer involved typically recruits 
the biological mother and represents the adopting parents. The 
opportunity for conflict of interest, especially to the disadvantage of the 
gestational mother, is very real. 
Social and Psychological Considerations 
Considerations, however, which may create problems are not limited 
only to those legal aspects directly associated with the pregnancy, the 
birth, parental rights and obligations, but also the future health and 
welfare of the child and family (families). As has become apparent in the 
"Baby M" case, there are multiple other potential difficulties which have 
broad implications. These include the following: 
A) Social considerations: 
I) Visitation rights of the biological mother. 
2) Rights of the child to information about the nature of its origins (i.e. , the 
surrogate arrangement). 
3) Rights of the child to information about the biological mother (as well as 
siblings) . , 
4) Value judgments in terms of who is acceptable, either as a biological 
mother or as an adopting parent. 
5) Entrepreneurism (which includes the motivation not just of the principals 
but also of both the medical and legal profession). 
B) Psychological impact on: 
I) the child 
2) the biological mother 
3) the family of the biological mother 
4) the biological father 
5) the family of the biological father 
The ramifications of these are, of course, endless and uncertain. The 
resolution of most, at best, is problematic. Many, if not all of these, are 
problems which occur (especially in traditional adoption) independent of 
the changes associated with modern reproductive technology. They can, 
however, be anticipated to be more central in the current arena of 
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surrogate parenting. In surrogacy, the pregnancy is deliberate with a 
specific purpose. In adoption , there is an attempt to find a desirable 
outcome for a typically unplanned pregnancy. Adoption is an answer for 
the mother, the child and the adopting parents. It is not a system that has as 
central to its operation financial gain to the mother, nor the attorney and 
involved physicians. 
Adoption is not a parallel to either surrogacy or artificial insemination, 
both of which make the desire for a child so dominant that the pregnancy is 
separated from the marriage and becomes an end in itself. In traditional 
adoption , there is mutual participation in an action in which individual 
biological fulfillment is set aside to provide a home for another's child . 
This can be an especially loving and unifying act of commitment for a 
couple. With older, handicapped , mixed race and minority children often 
in need of a home, a decision to adopt can be especially important. 
It has been argued that, in order to protect the individuals involved , 
surrogacy arrangements should be legalized and controlled . It is probable 
that such acts will legitimate the entrepreneurial aspects and further 
extend the process with widened opportunity for social and psychological 
harm. Surrogacy may have a negative impact on existing adoption 
arrangements. Publicity about surrogacy, especially the exchange of 
money, may have an effect on mothers who once would have placed their 
babies for adoption, and encourage them to seek "fees for service." 
Under most current state la ws , the surrogate child would be classified as 
illegitimate, recognizing it is a child born outside of marriage. There is 
extensive case law which provides for the welfare of children in such 
situations. The provisions of these existing laws could be applied if the 
contracts were not made legal. Such action would protect the child and , at 
the same time, allow the removal offinancial incentives to third parties and 
discourage women from having children primarily for their own financial 
gain. 
Justification of Surrogacy from the 
Standpoint of the Adopting Parents 
Inherent in the issue of surrogacy is a desire to provide children to 
couples or individuals who otherwise might be either unable to have 
children or able to have them only under circumstances unacceptable to 
them. In some instances, this may satisfy that natural desire simply to be a 
parent. From the biological father's standpoint, surrogate parenting might 
satisfy the desire for continuation of his genetic line; if married , this may be 
genuinely encouraged by his spouse. In some instances, it might be 
justified on the basis of the argument that there was an element of 
"insurance" (or assurance) that, in contrast to the usual adopting situation, 
at least some portion of the genetic pool (that portion contributed by the 
father) would be "known." It might be argued that this is more desirable 
than the situation in which an adoptive child might be brought into a 
family with either no, or only limited, knowledge of the genetic pool. The 
32 Linacre Quarterly 
uncertainty of that justification is made clear by the fact that in the "Baby 
M" case, Mary Beth Whitehead is said to have been selected as most 
desira ble out of a group of over 300 women to bear M r. Stern's child. The 
irony is that in the court pleadings, the Sterns, in part argued that because 
of her inadequacies. her parental rights should be terminated, and that 
they, not she, should be given custody. 
The desire of some couples to have children often has deep 
psychological and societal roots. It is understandable that when couples 
are faced with frustration and delays because of the difficulties in fulfilling 
these desires, surrogate parenting may seem a feasible or even expedient 
alternative. John Robertson seems to imply that surrogate parenting is 
more desirable than agency or independent adoption for the child, since 
adopted child ren often suffer identity problems because "they are not able 
to know their mothers."7 It would seem to follow, then , that he assumes 
surrogate children would not only be fully informed about their origins, 
but would also have the opportunity to know their biological mother. His 
further justification is that the surrogate children are "benefited, or at least 
not wronged, for without the surrogate arrangement, (they) would not 
have been born at all." The logical extension of this argument would 
appear to be that regardless of the circumstances, it is appropriate to bring 
as many children as possible into existence simply so that they have the 
opportunity of existence. Consideration of the previously mentioned 
social and psychological ramifications would seem to create a serious 
challenge to any argument that such surrogate children are not often 
wronged, even in contrast to adopted children. 
Emotional insecurity may be at the basis of the desperation which leads 
some to consider surrogacy. The woman may feel "less a woman" because 
she cannot bear her husband's child. He may feel "less a man" if he has no 
progeny. Either may be "less fulfilled" if not a parent. To recognize these 
factors and to deal with them may help couples not only to avoid the 
pitfalls of surrogacy, but also to reach a new maturity. , 
Certainly resentment on the part of the adopting mother may become a 
future possibility. The relationship between the biological father and 
biological mother is one prone to ambivalence; in time the same may be 
true of the child and the adopting mother. 
Justification on the Part of the Biological Mother 
There is limited data on what factors motivate women to become 
involved in surrogate parenting and to assume the role of biological 
mother. An obvious possibility, of questioned validity, is simple economic 
gain. Currently the total cost to an adopting parent for a surrogate 
arrangement is estimated to be in the range of $25,000 to $30,000. 8 A 
significant portion of this is allocated for physicians' and other medical 
expenses, some to legal fees , and typically, approximately $10,000 to the 
biological mother9 Other motivating factors which have been mentioned 
in the limited studies done include "the enjoyment of pregnancy and 
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associated attention". response to "guilt over past pregnancies, especially 
those which may have ended in abortion or adoption", and the feeling of 
having done "good" by providing "the gift of life" to others. 
From the biological mothers' standpoint. it is apparent there is a 
combination of altruistic. financial and psychological motives which are 
possible. As the "Baby M" case has demonstrated. the description of the 
biological mother simply as a "uterine" mother is inappropriate. The 
bonding that takes place during the pregnancy. as movement develops and 
the mother becomes aware of life. are typical experiences in pregnancy. It 
is highly probable that post-partum contact with the child and breast 
feeding will establish or further that bonding process. 
Potential negative factors. first of all from both an ethical and 
psychological aspect. involve the obvious separation of sexuality and 
reproduction. Such an arrangement typically involves what is. technically 
at least. conceptional adultery.11I In addition to the question of 
exploitation of the biological mother. other issues which have been 
suggested in some of those instances which have been publicized. include 
the tendency toward an elitism which favors the adopting parents. In 
surrogate parenting. the social parents are typically more affluent in 
contrast to the typically less affluent. disadvantaged. biological mother. As 
a Nell" York Times editorial bluntly put it: "The rich get kids and the poor 
get pregnant."11 
The "Baby M" Decision 
The March 31, 1987 decision of Judge Harvey R. Sorkow in 
Hackensack. New Jersey. awarded the child of Mary Beth Whitehead and 
William Stern to the father. Judge Sorkow listed as the primary issue the 
interests of the child. He. however. went beyond the matter of custody and 
upheld the surrogate contract as binding. There can be no quarrel with his 
desire to do what is best for the child. On the one hand. the Sterns were 
described as having a "private. quiet and unremarkable ~ ife which augurs 
well for a stable household environment." The judge noted that the Sterns 
showed "sensitivity to the child's physical and emotional needs. They 
would be supportive of education and have shown at least in their own 
lives a motivation toward learning. It can be concluded that they would 
initiate and encourage intellectual curiosity and learning for the child." 
Sorkow described Mrs. Whitehead as "manipulative. impulsive and 
exploiti ve." 
Given the choice between a couple who are well educated . affluent. and 
on the surface emotionally stable. and a woman with a past history of 
emotional instability, minimal education and financial insecurity. the 
awarding of the custody to the father was not surprising. The values 
chosen were those which have the highest rank in our society. Whether a 
life with Mary Beth Whitehead and her emotional lability and pandas to 
hug would have been better than the quiet Stern household with its pots 
and pans, no child psychologist can predict. What is clear is that it would 
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have been better if the choice were one that never had to be made. 
Judge Sorkow's decision to terminate all parental rights for Mary Beth 
Whitehead and to deny her any visitation appears to be an attempt by him 
to legitimize surrogacy. rather than only to serve the best interests of this 
child. Although perhaps intended to prevent confusion and psychological 
stress on the child. it was an unusual move if the decision is considered in 
the context of typical custody disputes. The decision appears to be one 
based not on social. psychological and ethical considerations. but rather 
one based on contract law. a concept more appropriate to stocks. 
commodity trading and real property. 
Ethical Considerations 
There is a strong position which argues against the use of artificial 
insemination. which is a first step in the entire process of surrogate 
parenting. There is still debate about the moral acceptability of artificial 
insemination and in vitro fertilization. This discussion has centered 
primarily on questions involved in surrogate parenthood . What is clear in 
the entire field of reproductive technology is that there is a definite 
tendency for procreation to be depersonalized at the same time that there is 
a separation of the unitive and procreative aspects of marriage. With that 
comes not only questions about personal sexual morality, but also much 
broader social implications which involve disruption of normal parenting 
patterns, and traditional family structure. 
The Vatican Document on Human Reproduction '2 of February, 1987. 
continues in the tradition of earlier writings which emphasize the 
importance of maintaining the exclusive place of reproductive acts in a 
relationship between husband and wife. The importance of the marriage is 
defended not only on religious, but also on social grounds. The document 
briefly discusses the question of surrogacy, pointing out "an objective 
failure to meet the obligations of maternal love, of conjugal fidelity, and of 
responsible motherhood; it offends dignity and the right of the child to be 
conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the world anti brought up by 
its own parents; it sets up to the detriment of the families a division 
between the physical, psychological, and moral elements which constitute 
those families." It is apparent that from a wide range of views, including 
those of many feminists concerned about the exploitation of women, there 
is strong agreement with the Vatican's position on surrogacy. Not only 
natural law arguments but also utilitarian arguments interdict the 
legitimization of surrogate parenting. 
An argument which appeals to the "right to have children" as a 
justification for surrogacy must recognize that even if such a right does 
exist, it is not an absolute right. It is most likely that if a valid argument can 
be made, there is a derivative right that couples cannot be prevented from 
having children. Just as a "right to health care" would not entitle one to 
health, there is no entitlement to a child. Even our constitutional right to 
free speech is limited by the mandate that we cannot exercise it in a way 
which would harm others. 
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Conclusion 
The consideration of surrogate arrangements by individuals who desire 
to have children and who have no other avenue readily available to them is 
understandable. Alternatives such as adoption may not satisfy the desire 
for genetic continu it y. even though surrogate parenting does not 
guarantee that. Neither natural parenting patterns. surrogate parenting. 
nor adoption guarantee the ideal child or the ideal family environment. All 
are uncertain and. at times. painful. Yet surrogacy for some seems to offer 
special hope . But the cort of marriage. Christian or otherwise. shou ld not 
be either the physical act or biologically related offspring. What shou ld be 
central is the mutual love for each other. Both the marital act and children 
should be an expression and fulfillment of the mutual love. 
Children born outside a marriage or conceived with the assistance of 
modern reproductive techniques may. regardless of the circumstances. be 
no less a blessing than other children. They. in fact. at times are more fully 
an expression of human love than some children born in "legitimate" 
unions. They lIlar reinforce the marriage bond and may well contribute to 
the commun ity and God's world more than many. Surrogacy 
arrangements of one kind or another existed in various cultures at various 
times over the centuries. Since insemination. artificial or otherwise. 
requires no spec ial scientific or medical knowledge and can occur without 
medical intervention. it is obvious that surrogacy will continue. What is 
most important is . such children should be treated by all members of 
society as any child brought into the world. that is. with care. love and 
compassion. 
What is different about commercial surrogate parenting is that it is 
associated with deliberate, planned separation of the genetic. gestationa l 
a nd social parenting and. by its very design, is at variance with cultural and 
religious understanding of maternal love. conjugal fidelity, and traditional 
parenting patterns. The possibility of changing a religious and cultura l 
tradition, in the light of reflection on human experience and new scientific 
knowledge . cannot be denied. However. the disruption of the marital 
relationship for the couple. the calculated abnormal family structure for 
the child. a nd the dehumanizing exp lo itation of biological mother involve 
such fundamental distortion of marriage . pregnancy and family that 
surrogacy is clearly unacceptable. Commercial surrogacy institutionalizes 
and medicalizes the processs and subjects it to entrepreneuria l forces. 
Opportunit ies for grave social and psychological harm, including the 
exploitation of women and infertile couples. are almost certain to increase 
with the spread and legitimatization of this practice. Attitudes which tend 
to dehumanize the woman. pregnancy, and the infant can be anticipated to 
be more prominent. 
Surrrogacy has inherent in it confusion over family and individual 
identity for the child. In commercial surrogacy the chi ld becomes an object 
of a transact ion which invo lves potential or real exploitation of not only 
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the biological mother, but other individuals involved. Although economic 
security is often a consideration when couples undertake any pregnancy, in 
commercial surrogacy economic factors are much more central. 
Entrepreneurial motivation on the part of the legal and medical profession 
cannot be discounted. 13 
There is something both strange and sad about a society which would 
disembody and commercialize the very beginning of life . Part of the 
traged y in acceptance of surrogacy is the lack of recognition of limits and a 
misunderstanding of the human condition. The desire for a child becomes 
so dominant that its conception and development are no longer rooted in 
mutual love and giving. The child is separated from that union and 
becomes an end in itself. Life as sac red is displaced by life as a commodity. 
With that change comes co nfusion , dehuma nization and often 
exploitation. 
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